Threat model / Honest status
Security claims with explicit trust boundaries
Security is a chain of assumptions, code, configuration, operators, and user behavior. SOS documents the native post-quantum boundary, the remaining external-chain cryptography, the role of untrusted provers, consensus assumptions, and the difference between test evidence and independent assurance.
Public testnet evidence exists; independent mainnet assurance remains a launch requirement.
Consensus assumption
Less than one-third Byzantine stake
Proof setup
Transparent, no trusted ceremony
Private witness
User-controlled prover
Current assurance
Pre-mainnet testnet
Native security boundary
SOS-native authorization uses ML-DSA-65. Hashing and derivation use SHA-3 and SHAKE-256. Shielded note delivery uses ML-KEM-1024 plus authenticated encryption. The network verifies transparent STARK receipts and binds transparent and shielded state into consensus.
Canonical serialization and versioned domain tags prevent the same signed or hashed bytes from being interpreted for another purpose. Validator-set identity and chain identity are bound into consensus preimages.
Operational security matters
A correct proof system does not protect an exposed seed phrase, leaked prover bearer token, compromised release channel, weak operator password, or misconfigured bridge. Releases need signed artifacts, protected deployment keys, monitored services, independent operators, bounded bridge value, and rehearsed rollback and drain procedures.
Report vulnerabilities safely
Potential vulnerabilities should be reported privately through the repository security-advisory workflow. A report should explain impact and reproduction without moving real value, attacking other operators, or publishing an exploit before maintainers can assess it.
The project should not present a public testnet, internal audit, chaos run, or successful bridge transfer as equivalent to an independent security audit. Each is useful evidence with a different scope.
Questions
Common questions
Has SOS reached mainnet security assurance?
No. SOS is a public pre-mainnet testnet. Independent review, operational decentralization, longer campaigns, and final launch controls remain distinct gates.
Can an untrusted prover steal funds with a false proof?
A validator accepts only a receipt that verifies against the pinned program and public journal. A malicious prover can refuse service or observe a witness sent to it, which is why users should control the prover.
Where can a vulnerability be reported privately?
Use the private security-advisory form in the public sos-node repository. Do not place exploit details or credentials in a normal public issue.
Primary sources
Last reviewed: 2026-07-21